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BLACK ROBES, WHITE JUDGES: THE
LACK OF DIVERSITY ON THE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE BENCH
JENNIFER L. THURSTON*
I
INTRODUCTION
The federal judicial system is made up of two types of judges: those created
by Article III of the United States Constitution1 and those created through the
power of Congress under Article I.2 The demographic makeup of these bodies is
curious. For decades—indeed, for nearly the first 200 years of its existence—the
federal bench was made up of white3 men. During this same time, efforts by
women and those of diverse racial backgrounds to enter the judiciary and the
legal profession were largely thwarted.
In an early effort in 1872, the United States Supreme Court4 refused to
overturn a decision of a lower court that found women could not be admitted to
the Bar.5 The concurring opinion noted, “The paramount destiny and mission of
woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the
law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general
constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases.”6
Nevertheless, seventy-five years later in 1949, President Harry S. Truman
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* Jennifer L. Thurston has been a Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of California since 2009.
Thanks to Chief District Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill and former Chief District Judge Morrison C. England
Jr., who encouraged me and supported me throughout my studies in the LL.M. program in Judicial
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the Federal Courts and the American Bar Association, as well as countless other bar associations across
the country who provided me much of the data upon which my conclusions are based. Most particularly,
thanks to my colleagues—the Magistrate Judges throughout the federal system—who work tirelessly and
often without thanks—to see that justice is provided to the litigants in their courts.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
2. Congress was granted the power “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
3. I use the term “white” to refer to those who are non-Hispanic Caucasians and “non-white” to
refer to everyone else. I use these words not because I believe they are properly descriptive but merely
to match the phraseology used in the published data. I mean no offense when using these archaic
descriptors.
4. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
5. Id. at 139.
6. Id. at 141.
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appointed Burnita Shelton Matthews to a federal judgeship, making her the first
female district judge in history.7
People of color faced similar difficulties. Macon Bolling Allen is credited with
being the first African American to receive his license to practice law in 1844.8
Unable to secure enough clients—most whites would not hire him—he
supplemented his income by obtaining a position as a Justice of the Peace. This
made him the first African American judge despite that the United States
Constitution at that time did not consider him to be a citizen of this country. It
was not for another 100 years that, finally, in 1937, the first African American
District Judge, William Henry Hastie9, was appointed to the bench. It was not
until 1966 that the first African American woman, Constance Baker Motley, was
appointed to the federal district court.10
Over the years, women and people of color have made inroads into the
federal judiciary, but until Jimmy Carter took office only eight women had ever
been appointed to Article III judgeships and only six served at that time.11 By the
end of the Carter Administration, forty women served. Carter’s approach was
goal-oriented and effective.12 He modified the selection process away from a
system of political patronage and toward one focused on the quality of the
candidate.13 He made diversity a goal and developed citizen nominating
commissions that actively recruited and encouraged women and people of color
to apply for judgeships.14
Though still appointing mostly white males, President Clinton was the first to
appoint fewer than 60% white males during his time in office and the first to
appoint more than 20% female judges.15 George W. Bush brought more Latinas
to the bench than all of the administrations before him combined, appointing
twelve females of Latin American descent.16

7. Women’s
History
Month,
U.S.
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/educational-resources/annual-observances/womens-history-month
[https://perma.cc/N7LCG9S9] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). By this time, women had been appointed to other judicial positions,
including as a Magistrate in the U.S. Customs Court, and in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
(Apr.
2,
2014)
8. Macon
Bolling
Allen
Biography,
BIOGRAPHY.COM
http://www.biography.com/people/macon-bolling-allen-21342461 [https://perma.cc/2M43-77AE].
9. Interview by Jerry N. Hess with Judge William H. Hastie, Third Circuit Court of Appeals in
Philadelphia,
Pa.
(Jan.
5,
1972),
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/hastie.htm
[https://perma.cc/98SG-AYRJ]. President Truman previously appointed him to the position of the
Governor of the Virgin Islands.
10. Motley,
Constance
Baker,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/motley-constance-baker
[https://perma.cc/3RUL-MXC8] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
11. Mary L. Clark, Carter’s Groundbreaking Appointment of Women to the Federal Bench: His
Other “Human Rights” Record, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1131, 1132–33 (2002).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Jonathan K. Stubbs, A Demographic History of Federal Judicial Appointments by Sex and Race:
1789–2016, 26 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 92, 107–08 (2016).
16. Id. at 108.
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The Obama administration made strides toward improving the diversity of
the federal bench. President Obama appointed the first Haitian American, the
first Native American female and the first Afro-Caribbean district judges.17 He
was the first to focus on the LGBT community when seeking out judicial
candidates and appointed the first openly gay Circuit Court judge.18 Nineteen
percent of Obama’s overall appointments were African Americans; he appointed
more African American females than any other president in history. He
appointed more Asian American women than all the Presidents before him
combined.19
President Obama’s tactic was a modified version of Carter’s initiatives.
Though still relying upon senators to identify judicial hopefuls, he sought the
assistance of female and minority members of Congress.20 He encouraged
minority and women’s groups to propose judicial candidates.21 He promoted
candidates who had the support of both major political parties and was successful
in appointing most of those he nominated.22 He did this without sacrificing
quality. 23
17. Jennifer Bendery, Senate Confirms First-Ever Native American Woman as a Federal Judge,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2014, 10:07 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/15/nativeamerican-judge_n_5330273.html?ec_carp=4279952720454742018
[https://perma.cc/2YPF-QQD8];
Donna Owens, Obama’s Legacy on Judicial Appointments, by the Numbers, NBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2017,
9:21 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/president-obama-the-legacy/obama-s-legacy-judicialappointments-numbers-n709306 [https://perma.cc/P5FU-GW6S].
18. Diane Bartz, U.S. Senate Confirms First Openly Gay Federal Appeals Court Judge, REUTERS
(Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-judge-gay/u-s-senate-confirms-first-openly-gayfederal-appeals-court-judge-idUSBRE98N16D20130924?feedType=RSS&feedName=domesticNews
[https://perma.cc/CFG9-VZH5]. Judge Todd M. Hughes is a 1992 graduate of Duke Law School.
19. Stubbs, supra note 15, at 108–09.
20. Carl Tobias, Justifying Diversity in the Federal Judiciary, 106 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY 283, 287–
88 (2012).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. In contrast, as of November 30, 2017, however, President Trump nominated only one African
American, three Asian-American, and one biracial candidate of the 60 he has nominated. Joan Biskupic,
Aaron Kessler & Ryan Struyk, Trump judicial picks lack decades-long diversity drive, CNN POLITICS,
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/30/politics/trump-judges-courts-race/index.html [https://perma.cc/2A8PUVRE] (last updated Nov. 30, 2017). Of these 60 candidates, less than 19% were women, down from
nearly 42% nominated by President Obama. Id. Most of those nominated by the President have been
white men. Id. Though more than 80% of the candidates nominated by President Trump have received
“Well-qualified” ratings by the American Bar Association, 8% have been rated “Not qualified.” Id.
Exactly how the ABA determines a candidate is “qualified,” is unclear. For example, the Senate
Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing on December 13, 2017 to consider several judicial candidates.
Nominations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/12/13/2017/nominations
[https://perma.cc/D724-DSQZ]
(video beginning at 1:50:57 on recording) (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). A portion of the hearing focused on
a white, male candidate being questioned about his experience by Senator John Kennedy (R) of
Louisiana (a former constitutional law professor at Louisiana State University). The candidate admitted
to having never tried a bench or jury trial, never having taken a deposition on his own though he attended
less than five as a newly minted law firm associate, never having argued a motion in court, not knowing
what a motion in limine was, not having made a “comprehensive” review of the Federal Rules of
Evidence or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since law school and not knowing what the Daubert
standard was. Despite this, the ABA gave this candidate a “qualified” rating. Standing Comm. on the
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It has been through the will of presidential administrations that women and
people of color have been added to the district judge bench. Still, this change has
failed to achieve a judiciary whose demographic makeup roughly approximates
that of the country’s population, and the diversification of the district judge bench
has not been duplicated on the magistrate judge bench.
From 2009 to 2016, females on the district court bench increased 13.2%, from
19.4% to 32.6%, and non-white district judges increased 10.6%, from 16.4% to
27.0%.24 During this same period, the number of female magistrate judges
increased only by 7.2% and non-whites increased by a paltry 1.2%.25 “Pipeline
issues” may account for some part of the problem when seeking to diversify the
magistrate judge bench, but, given the success of recent Presidential
Administrations in diversifying the district judge bench, it cannot account for all
of it.
Some of the problem stems from the selection process for magistrate judges.
Applicants tend to be self-selected. Facing an all-white bench is likely to be
discouraging to prospective non-white hopefuls. Likewise, unlike the political
selection process for district judges, magistrate judge candidates engage in a
multi-step merit selection process that winnows applicants down to a handful
from which the successful candidate emerges. Differing instructions to the
selection panels, differing priorities, and differing judicial philosophies all work
against the selection of diverse candidates for the magistrate judge bench.
Part II of this paper will discuss the methodology employed and the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the data examined. Part III examines whether it
matters to the quality of justice dispensed if the magistrate judge bench is not
made up of judicial officers of diverse demographics. Part IV examines the
available data to reveal the relative diversity of the district court bench when
compared to the magistrate judge bench. Part V discusses the differing selection
processes for district and magistrate judges as a possible source for the
differences in the diversity of these benches. Finally, Part VI will analyze the
impediments to achieving the goal of diversity of this bench and suggest solutions.
II
STUDY METHODOLOGY
The data for this paper was gathered from many sources. The federal
Administrative Office of the United States Courts provided data detailing the
demographic makeup of the district courts. The Federal Judicial Center provided
information as to the demographic makeup of the district judges for each judicial

Fed. Judiciary, Ratings of Article II and Article IV Judicial Nominees: 115th Congress, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/Web%20rating%
20Chart%20Trump%20115.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLT5-VG9T] (last updated Dec. 13,
2018).
24. See infra Figs. 1, 2.
25. See infra Figs. 4, 5.
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district.26 The American Bar Association, the U.S. Census Bureau, and
mandatory bar associations throughout the country provided the demographics
of bar membership in each state. Also, the author surveyed the chief judges from
ninety-one of the federal judicial districts27 and conducted interviews of many of
these judges to understand their views about judicial diversity. The author also
surveyed the entire body of active federal magistrate judges to gather their
demographic data and to inquire about their court’s efforts to diversify the bench.
Finally, the author searched out members of recent merit selection panels across
the country and surveyed them about their experiences selecting new magistrate
judges.
The data is flawed in many respects. First, the Administrative Office changed
the way it reported the data over time. In some years, the reports combine fulltime and part-time magistrate judges and state their demographics collectively.
In some years the senior district judges were included in the numbers for active
district judges, rather than as a separate category. Moreover, the AO reports only
broad categories of races/ethnicities without regard for those who identify with
more than one race. Consequently, to harmonize the data, the author included
an “other” category to account for those who describe themselves differently
than these categories or who identify with more than one race.28
Second, the data from the FJC did not easily compare to the data provided
by the AO. For example, four districts, the Eastern and Western Districts of
Oklahoma and the Eastern and Western Districts of Missouri, “share” judges.
Thus, the three who sit in the districts in Missouri and the one who sits on both
districts in Oklahoma are reported on the statistics of both courts. In addition,
the FJC data does not distinguish between active and senior district judges. Thus,
the author took these disparities into account.
On the other hand, the U.S. Census Bureau data is current to the year 2010
and is not complete. For example, there are many government lawyers practicing
in the federal system who may not be members of the “mandatory” bar
associations in the state in which they practice. This flaw exists in the ABA and
other bar association data also. Demographic data from state bar associations,
when it exists, relies on surveys with voluntary responses. Thus, the author
applied the data to the total membership, despite the fact that the responses may
not be representative. Finally, data reported by mandatory bar associations often
differed from the data reported to and by the ABA.
Nevertheless, by using the available data, a fair picture developed as to the
demographic breakdown of lawyers practicing in each state. Even still, though
many states have only one federal judicial district, many states have more than

26. The FJC does not maintain historical or current demographic data on magistrate judges.
27. Because of the lack of comparative data for the districts in the Virgin Islands, the Northern
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam, the survey did not take these courts into consideration.
28. To best capture the efforts of courts to diversity the bench, when characterizing a person as
white or non-white, the author considered anyone of mixed race to be non-white.
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one. Thus, the statewide data does not provide a specific picture of the
demographics of each judicial district.
Also of concern, the chief judges interviewed were self-selected and some
openly admitted to volunteering for interviews to address their own specific
agendas—for example, to explain why more diversity could not be achieved or
why diversity has been achieved easily. There was a consistent report on many
topics so the information gleaned is important and informs many of the
conclusions offered in this study.
Also, Magistrate Judges responded inconsistently about the total number of
active, female, and non-white magistrate judges on their courts. To resolve these
disputes, the author studied the websites from these districts and, for the most
part, verified the correct numbers.
Finally, gathering a representative set of data from members of the merit
selection panels was difficult. Many courts do not publish the names of their
panelists and, when they do, they usually do not publish contact information. The
author scoured the Internet to find press releases, general orders, and attorney
websites that identified members of the panels and contact information. The data
gathered reflects responses from eighty-five former members of panels
representing thirty-seven districts across the federal system.
III
DOES IT MATTER IF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE BENCH IS NOT DIVERSE?
When the office was created by Congress, magistrate judges were intended to
serve an “integral and important role in the federal judicial system.”29
Burgeoning caseloads in an era of few new judgeships placed an extraordinary
and impossible burden on district judges. “Given the bloated dockets that district
courts have now come to expect as ordinary, the role of the magistrate in today’s
federal judicial system is nothing less than indispensable.”30 Writing about the
roles of Article I judges, Justice Sotomayor said famously, “It is no exaggeration
to say that without the distinguished service of these judicial colleagues, the work
of the federal court system would grind nearly to a halt.”31
Indeed, since 1990, the number of magistrate judges has increased by more
than sixty percent.32 Since 1999, about forty new magistrate judge positions were
added compared to half this number for district judge positions.33 In 2015, there
were 551 full-time magistrate judges compared to 625 district judges.34

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991).
Id. (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)).
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1938–39 (2015).
See infra Figs. 4, 5.
See infra Figs. 1–4.
See infra Figs. 1–4.
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In 2016, magistrate judges handled 1,087,249 matters made up of felony
preliminary proceedings,35 criminal matters,36 Class A misdemeanors and other
petty offenses, civil matters37 (which included more than 16,000 matters handled
on consent), prisoner cases,38 miscellaneous matters, and 566,336 “additional
duties.”39 The increasing number of dispositive orders magistrate judges issue
translates to an increased importance of this bench to litigants and leads to the
conclusion that diversity must be considered for this bench just as it is for district
judges.
With regularity, legal commentators publish articles setting forth the
importance of judicial diversity and the reasons proffered don’t vary much. Many
believe diversity promotes confidence in the judiciary.40 They argue a judiciary
made up of people of all skin colors, genders, and backgrounds instills the belief
that the legal system is not just for those traditionally in power. In 2011, White
House Counsel Kathryn Ruemmler explained that “[t]he president wants the
federal courts to look like America . . . He wants people who are coming to court
to feel like it’s their court as well.”41
Unlike courts of appeal with their three-judge panels, as trial judges
magistrate judges sit alone. When in trial, they typically lack the luxury of
consulting colleagues about the intricacies of the legal issues brought before
them. They may receive legal argument from counsel, but like any other trial
judge, to be efficient, they must rule then and there. Moreover, whether the
judge’s demographics match those of the litigants before the court42 is a matter of
chance.43 This begs the question whether a diverse trial bench makes a difference
to the outcome of any case. A simplistic view is that when the judge “matches”
35. “Felony preliminary proceedings” includes search and arrest warrants, initial appearances and
arraignments, bail review hearings, preliminary examinations, attorney appointments, detention hearings
and the like.
36. “Criminal” matters included motions, pretrial conferences, evidentiary hearings, guilty pleas,
probation revocation proceedings, reentry/drug court proceedings, etc.
37. This included social security appeals, settlement conferences, pretrial conferences, motions,
evidentiary hearings, etc.
38. This includes habeas corpus petitions, civil rights litigation and evidentiary hearings.
39. FED. JUDICIARY, TABLE S-17—MATTERS DISPOSED OF BY U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGES
DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007 THROUGH 2016 (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_s17_0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7N4QEMNQ].
40. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?:The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of
the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423, 1429 (2008).
41. John Schwartz, For Obama, a Record on Diversity but Delays on Judicial Confirmations, N.Y.
TIMES,
August
6,
2011,
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/us/politics/07courts.html
[https://perma.cc/7HPX-UKXU].
42. African Americans are incarcerated in this country at more than five times the rate of Caucasian
Americans. In 2014, 2.3 million of the 6.8 million inmates in the United States were African Americans.
Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/KF3X4DJG] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). Given these figures, it is hard to know whether courts should “look
like” the litigants or “look like America.”
43. Most courts assign cases to their judges randomly. Generally, at the outset of a case, the court
has no information about the race or gender of the litigants.
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the litigant, the judge is better able to empathize with the factual situation at
issue.44 What, then, is the result for the “non-matching” litigant?
Even if the bench reflects perfectly the demographics of the community in
which the magistrate judge sits, in truth, diversity does not assure fairness any
more than a lack of diversity assures unfairness. The color of the judge’s skin,
whether the judge grew up in poverty, sleeps with a person of the same gender,
has a strong political identity, or regularly attends church, does not ensure the
judge will rule in favor of a litigant who has a similar background. To suggest
otherwise sorely ignores judges’ commitment to the dictates of the law.
Though it is unlikely diversity is the “silver bullet” for justice, to suggest that
it has no bearing on the quality of decision making is equally unlikely. For
example, one study found that though female judges often attended lesser quality
law schools and undergraduate schools, had less experience after law school, had
less judicial experience, and were often younger than their male colleagues, when
appointed to their state’s highest courts, they performed as well as men.45 Though
they published less frequently, when they did publish, the opinions of these
female judges were cited as frequently as those authored by men.46 Female judges
tend to be more independent in their decision making and despite the assumption
they perform better in certain areas, such as family law; in fact, they perform as
well as men in all practice areas.47 This suggests that although female judicial
applicants may not present as well on paper, their skills may be equal to or
superior to the male applicant who has an exemplary record.
The results of studies inquiring whether a judge’s gender or race impacts cases
are mixed.48 One study determined that female judges tended to regard sex
discrimination claims more favorably than male judges.49 This same study
concluded that gender does not matter when female judges decide cases involving
“women’s issues,” such as sexual harassment affirmative action or abortion
litigation.50 Though female judges are more likely to rule in favor of the plaintiff
in some types of cases,51 they do not decide race discrimination cases differently
44. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State
Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 134 (1997).
45. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Mirya Holman & Eric A. Posner, Judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD., 504, 526 (2011).
46. Id. at 515–16.
47. Id. at 526.
48. Christina L. Boyd, Representation on the Courts? The Effects of Trial Judges’ Sex and Race, 69
POL. RES. Q. 788, 789–91 (2016). Professor Boyd provides an excellent analysis of the confusion related
to whether the gender and race of judges matters to judging.
49. Choi, Gulati, Holman & Posner supra note 45, at 505 (citing Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges
Matter Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005)).
50. Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on
Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010).
51. Peresie, supra note 49, at 1761 (An empirical analysis of 556 federal appellate cases decided in
1999, 2000, and 2001 reveals that judges’ gender mattered to case outcomes. Though plaintiffs lost in the
vast majority of cases, they were significantly more likely to prevail when a female judge was on the
bench.). This study concluded that in federal court, though a female plaintiff is most likely to fail in her
sexual discrimination case, when the matter is assigned to a female judge, her chance of success doubles.
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than their male counterparts. Though most personal injury and civil rights cases
settle in federal court, when these cases are assigned to a female settlement judge,
they are even more likely to settle and to settle earlier.52
When a federal appellate panel considering a sexual harassment case includes
at least one female, her male colleagues on the panel are twice as likely to find
for the plaintiff than if the panel was made up of only men.53 In sexual
discrimination appeals the presence of the female panelist nearly triples the
likelihood the plaintiff will prevail.54 Black judges are much more likely than
white judges to decide in favor of the plaintiff in gender discrimination cases.55
Other studies reveal that outcomes in cases of race discrimination, voting rights,
school desegregation, and affirmative action, do not vary significantly when
decided by non-white judges rather than white judges.56 In a similar study, the
author determined that plaintiffs in race-based harassment cases were 3.3 times
more likely to prevail when their case was decided by a black judge than a white
judge, according to logistic regression analysis.57
A different study concluded black appellate judges rule in favor of the party
raising race-based affirmative action programs in about 90% of cases, and white
judges who sit with a black colleague vote in favor of such parties in 80% of the
cases.58 When a black Democrat judge sits on a panel with a two non-black
Republican judges, a non-black Republican judge will vote in favor of a liberal
outcome 86% of the time.59
Though these studies do not demonstrate that diversity matters when
considering fairness, the impact of diversity on outcomes emphasizes the need to
consider it when populating the magistrate judge bench. Even when a magistrate
judge’s demographics are different from the litigants’, just like a district judge,
when deciding areas of novel or complicated legal issues, a magistrate judge is
likely to be influenced by orders issued by others on the district’s bench.60 Thus,
orders from a judge of a diverse background may impact outcomes of cases with
which the judge has no direct contact.

52. Christina L. Boyd, She’ll Settle It, 1 J. L. & CTS. 193, 211 (2013).
53. Peresie, supra note 49, at 1778. In a similar study, different researchers came to a similar
conclusion. Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex
on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010).
54. Id.
55. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of
Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1133–34 (2009) (citing Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects
of Judges’ Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981-1996 (June
1999) (unpublished PhD. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with authors)).
56. Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton’s District Court
Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 144 (2000).
57. Chew & Kelley, supra note 55, at 1156. See also Boyd, supra note 48.
58. Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 167, 179 (2012).
59. Id.
60. See id. (discussing district court judges).

THURSTON - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

72

4/26/2019 10:21 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 82:63

In areas where discretion is vested in the trial judge, it is more likely the judge
will rule according to a sense of what is right.61 Because these cases are much less
likely to be reversed on appeal, this is a key opportunity for diversity to impact
the development of the law.
Even if diversity plays no role in case outcomes, chief judges interviewed for
this study almost uniformly stated diversity on the magistrate judge bench lends
credibility to the court. Regarding the importance of diverse judicial benches, one
chief judge commented, “Justice lives as much on perception as on reality.”
Another Chief Judge remarked criminal defendants “should see a bench that
reflects their community” and “diversity is a message that all races and ethnicities
are important.” Another Chief Judge valued colleagues with differing
viewpoints, “More viewpoints support a better long-term view” for the court and
improves court governance. One Chief Judge stated that a diverse bench
communicates to the public, “This is our court; it is a court of the community.”
Another remarked, “A diverse bench provides a different perspective and
supports a public perception of fairness.”
Seemingly, at least in the opinion of these chief judges, a bench that ignores
this reality risks legitimacy in the eyes of those it serves. Several Chief Judges
explained that if a criminal defendant enters the courthouse and sees a bench
made up of those who do not look like him or her, this adds to the suspicion that
fairness will not be forthcoming. One Chief Judge noted a Magistrate Judge is
usually the first judge a criminal defendant will see and having a diverse bench
lets the defendant know it won’t be “just white men passing judgment” on them.
IV
THE DIVERSITY OF THE FEDERAL TRIAL COURT BENCH
A. The District Judge Bench
Of the 601 district judges in 1999, 483 were male and 118 were female. All but
ninety-six judges identified themselves as white. By 2016, of the 625 district
judges in the bench, 421 were male and 204 were female, and 160 were non-white.
Fourteen courts had at least one-third of their positions filled by non-white
judges, and sixty-one courts had at least one district judge who was non-white.
This represents a 10% gain in the total number who were non-white. By 2016,
females on the bench increased from little more than 20% to more than 32%.
Only eight courts did not have at least one female district judge and twenty-four
courts were made up of at least 30% female district judges.

61. Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the judiciary: The
Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 264 (1995).
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Figure 1: Non-White District Judges in the Federal System by Year

The growth in the numbers of females on the bench since 2010 is not
attributable to any one district—indeed many districts did not improve at all and
some decreased in the numbers of those of diverse demographics—but overall,
there was a steady increase of non-white and female judges. Though some
districts (Alabama Middle, Alabama Southern, Delaware, Georgia Northern,
Georgia Southern, Kansas, Louisiana Western, Michigan Western, Mississippi
Southern, Nebraska, Ohio Southern, Puerto Rico, Texas Eastern, and Wyoming)
had increases in diversity, the statistics changed only because the number of
district judges changed.
Other courts (Illinois Central, Iowa Northern, Tennessee Eastern, and
Tennessee Western) became less diverse. This decrease was caused not by a loss
of judges but by an increase in the number of white, male district judges.
According to the available data for these states, there were not sufficient
numbers of lawyers with diverse backgrounds practicing within the states to allow
for the appointment of diverse judges except in Tennessee where there were
sufficient numbers of female.62 Arkansas Eastern, California Northern,
California Southern, Florida Middle, Florida Southern, Missouri Eastern, and
Tennessee Middle court had changes in the ratio of females or non-whites due to
the decrease in the number of total district judges in that court.

62. See infra Fig 6.
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Figure 2: Female District Judges in the Federal System by Year

Female District Judges
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According to the Bar membership data, pipeline problems did not prevent
diversification for some courts though vacant positions were not filled by nonwhite and/or female candidates. Arkansas Western, California Eastern, Florida
Northern, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New York Southern, New
York Western, Oregon, and Washington Eastern had sufficient numbers of
female bar members to add to the bench, and North Carolina Western should
have been able to do better in adding non-white and female judges.63
Connecticut, New York Eastern, Pennsylvania Eastern, Tennessee Middle,
Tennessee Western, Texas Western, and Virginia Eastern all added non-white
judges rather than adding females despite the fact that this caused the non-whites
to be overrepresented and females remained underrepresented,64 at least
according to the published statistics of bar membership in these states.
Of the courts that demonstrated improvement in their diversity not caused by
a change in the number of judges, most failed to have a representative number of
women.65 Other courts became more diverse and, in doing so, appointed diverse
judges despite that the percentage of female and non-white lawyers in the state
was lower than the percentage achieved by the court.66
63. This presupposes that all of the members of the Bar are qualified for the position and eligible
for appointment and this is, of course, unlikely to be the case.
64. See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff,
16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 457 (2002).
65. These courts include Alaska, Arkansas Western, California Northern, California Southern,
Florida Middle, Florida Southern, Georgia Middle, Hawaii, Illinois Northern, Illinois Southern, Iowa
Southern, Indiana Northern, Kentucky Eastern, Kentucky Western, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan Eastern, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York Northern, New York Western, North
Carolina Middle, Pennsylvania Eastern, Tennessee Eastern, Washington Eastern, and Wisconsin
Eastern. The diversity numbers for Michigan Eastern, and New Mexico were more difficult to interpret
because, the statistics for female lawyers in the state varied and these districts compared favorably to
some but not others.
66. These courts included Alabama Northern, Arizona, Florida Southern, Illinois Southern,
Louisiana Eastern, Louisiana Middle, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan Eastern, Minnesota,
Mississippi Northern, Missouri Western, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania Eastern, Puerto Rico, South
Carolina, Tennessee Middle, Utah, and Virginia Eastern. Some of these courts improved in only one
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Figure 3: Relative Change in Diversity of the District Judge Benches by District,
2010-2017

B. The Magistrate Judge Bench
1. Legal Scholarship
Despite recognition by scholars and others of the importance of Magistrate
Judges to the federal judicial system, Magistrate Judges are rarely studied. Of the
few papers devoted to studying this bench, most consider the source of the
authority of these judges,67 the iterations of the present-day Magistrate Judge
area, but in the category in which they showed improvement, they achieved a higher percentage of either
non-white or female judges that the published data suggests they could.
67. E.g., David A. Bell, The Power to Award Sanctions: Does It Belong in the Hands of Magistrate
Judges?, 61 ALB. L. REV. 433 (1998) (arguing that the Federal Magistrate Act and Rule 72 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure support the proposal that magistrate judges have jurisdiction to enter sanction
orders); Ira P. Robbins, Magistrate Judges, Article III, and the Power to Preside Over Federal Prisoner
Section 2255 Proceedings, 2002 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2 (2002) (arguing against referral of motions filed
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to magistrate judges for final disposition); Christopher E. Smith, From U.S.
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system,68 and the roles these judges play in the increasingly overworked district
judge bench.69 Only a couple consider decision-making by these judges and it
remains unclear whether the data support that magistrate judges exercise their
own, independent judgment or they “look over their shoulders” and decide based
upon how they think the district judge would want the issue decided.70 Few
consider who these judges are and the impact of their backgrounds on their
decision-making.71
A recent study notes the relative lack of diversity of the Article I benches.72
The author asserts that the federal benches should reflect the country’s
population, which is more than 50% female and about 40% people of color.
However, the paper fails to account for the variations of these populations across
states and districts.73

Magistrates to U.S. Magistrate Judges: Developments Affecting the Federal District Courts’ Lower Tier of
Judicial Officers, 75 JUDICATURE 210 (1992) (examining the history and authority of magistrate judges).
68. E.g., Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 39 VAL. U.
L. REV. 661, (2005) (contemplating the expansion of the role of the magistrate judge); Ruth Dapper, A
Judge by Any Other Name: Mistitling of the United States Magistrate Judge,” 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2015)
(examining the prevalence of titling error in legal writing as it relates to magistrate judges); Leslie G.
Foschio, A History of the Development of the Office of United States Commissioner and Magistrate Judge
System, 1 FED. CTS. L. REV. 607 (2006) (reviewing the origins of the present magistrate system); Douglas
A. Lee & Thomas E. Davis, “Nothing Less Than Indispensable”: The Expansion of Federal Magistrate
Judge Authority and Utilization in the Past Quarter Century, 16 NEV. L.J. 845 (2016) (examining the
expansion of magistrate authority); Philip M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, Measured Progress: The
Evolution and Administration of the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1503 (1995)
(discussing the evolution and administration of the magistrate system); Christopher E. Smith, Judicial
Lobbying and Court Reform: U.S. Magistrate Judges and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 14 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 163 (1992) (examining interactions between magistrate judges and the
legislature).
69. E.g., Bloom & Hershkoff, supra note 64 (examining the relationship between pro se litigants
and magistrate judges).
70. E.g., Christina L. Boyd & Jacqueline M. Sievert, Unaccountable Justice? The Decision Making
of Magistrate Judges in the Federal District Courts, 34 JUST. SYS. J. 249 (2013) (evaluating the magistrate’s
decision making and its constraints); Christina L. Boyd, The Comparative Outputs of Magistrate Judges,
16 NEV. L.J. 949 (2016) (examining judicial decisions by magistrate judges); Jack Knight, Mitu Gulati &
David Levi, How Bayesian Are Judges?, 16 NEV. L.J. 1061 (2016) (analyzing the presumption that judges
constantly update their thinking with new information).
71. Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Article I Judges in an Article III World; The Career Path
of Magistrate Judges, 16 NEV. L.J. 823 (2016) (examining the career path of magistrate judges); Marian
Payson, Diversity in the Magistrate Judge System, FED. LAWYER, May–June 2014, at 55, 56 (analyzing
diversity in the magistrate system).
72. KATE BERRY, BUILDING A DIVERSE BENCH: SELECTING FEDERAL MAGISTRATE AND
BANKRUPTCY JUDGES, (Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y.U. Sch. of Law & Am. Bar Ass’n Judicial Div.,
2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Building_A_Diverse_
Bench_0726.pdf [https://perma.cc/K834-PS6L] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
73. Id. at 7. The suggestion that the pipeline should be expanded with women and people of color,
though facially attractive, ignores the shrinking job market for new lawyers in many populous areas and
that a student entering law school today would not be prepared to ascend to the bench for upwards of 20
years. Focusing on those who have already met the prerequisites would yield earlier dividends.
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2. Diversity on the Bench
In 1999, there were 450 full-time magistrate judges. 74 Of these, 348 were men,
102 were women and 41 were non-white. By 2016, there were 519 magistrate
judges; 324 were men, 195 were women, and 76 were people of color. This
represents only about a 5.5% increase in non-white judges.
Figure 4: Non-White Magistrate Judges in the Federal System by Year

Women fared better in joining the magistrate judge ranks and by 2015 made
up 37.6% of the bench. Nearly 80% of these female magistrate judges were white.
Of the ninety-one districts studied, by 2016, thirteen courts had at least onethird of their bench made up of non-white judges, and fifty-one courts had only
white magistrate judges. Of these latter courts, six had at least one-quarter of
their district judge benches filled by non-white judges and another five had at
least 20% non-white district judges.
Thirty-one courts had at least half of their bench made up of women, and
another fifty-nine had at least 30% women. Of the ninety-one courts studied,
seventy-nine had at least one female magistrate judge. Of the twelve courts that
had no female magistrate judges, only three had no female district judges.

74. The report issued in September 2017, which should have detailed the 2015-2016 fiscal year data,
provides the identical data as in the September 2016 report (which described the demographic data as of
September 2015). The data for the years 2007 through 2009 appears to have included senior district
judges, though these judges were not included in the data for the other years.
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Figure 5: Female Magistrate Judges in the Federal System by Year

C. By the Numbers
Authors frequently criticize leaders for maintaining non-diverse judicial
benches. Invariably, they compare the benches to the state population and find
the benches lacking. A large reason for this comparison is the sparse
demographic data for the mandatory bar associations. Though nearly every state
bar association commits itself to diversity in the profession, most do a poor job in
tracking the demographics of its members.
The membership in the various mandatory bars, at least as much as can be
seen from the available data, presents obstacles for those attempting to select
diverse judges. For example, California is a hugely diverse state with a non-white
population of 62%.75 However, in 2017 the California Bar Association76
determined that only 11% of its membership is non-white. Further complicating
the process is that the state is made up of fifty-eight counties and four federal
judicial districts. Due to a lack of county- and district-specific demographic data
for lawyers, and given that it is unlikely that the state bar membership is
uniformly diverse, the available data do not necessarily explain the extent to
which a diverse judiciary can be selected.

75. TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON
STATE COURTS? (Am. Constitutional Soc’y, George, Tracey E., Yoon, Albert H., 2016),
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/gavel-gap-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7VV5PKJY] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
76. These results were gratefully obtained through the courtesy of the California State Bar (on file
with author).
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Figure 6: Numbers of Lawyers with Diverse Backgrounds by District
Most
2017 2017 Recent
2010
DJ
MJ Bar Data Census

Total
Total Non-White
% Non White
Total Female
% Female
Total
Total Non-White
% Non White
Total Female
% Female
Total
Total Non-White
% Non White
Total Female
% Female
Total
Total Non-White
% Non White
Total Female
% Female
Total
Total Non-White
% Non White
Total Female
% Female
Total
Total Non-White
% Non White
Total Female
% Female
Total
Total Non-White
% Non White
Total Female
% Female
Total
Total Non-White
% Non White
Total Female
% Female
Total
Total Non-White
% Non White
Total Female
% Female
Total
Total Non-White
% Non White
Total Female
% Female

ABA

State
Pop

Alabama Middle
2016 (Act.)
5
4 18,112 9,116 14,717
1
2 1,512
582 1,163
20% 50%
8%
6%
8% 34%
0
1 5,844
278
0% 25%
32%
35%
52%
Alaska
2017 (Est.)
6
4 4,326 1,838 2,402
0
0
215
48
72
0% 0%
5%
3%
3% 38%
1
2 1,108
512
17% 50%
27%
28%
47%
Arkansas Western
2017
6
3 ***
4,219 6,851
0
0 ***
194
0% 0% ***
5%
27%
1
1 ***
1,009
17% 33% ***
24%
51%
California Northern
2017
24 12 105,335 112,338 168,746
9
4 22,241 12,622
38% 33%
21%
11%
62%
7
8 36,807 35,100
29% 67%
41%
31%
50%
Connecticut
2017
13
5 *** 14,435 21,341
3
0 ***
758
23% 0% ***
5%
31%
4
3 ***
3,864
31% 60% ***
27%
51%
Florida Middle
2016 (Est.)
27 17 86,977 45,482 77,008
7
2 92,196 1,975 9,241
26% 12%
16%
4%
12% 44%
8
5 33,051 12442
30% 29%
38%
27%
51%
Georgia Middle
2016
6
3 20,593 *** 31,672
2
0 2,179 ***
33% 0%
11% ***
46%
1
0 5,540 ***
17% 0%
27% ***
51%
Hawaii
2016 (Est.)
7
3 3,259 3,159 4,236
3
0 1,101 1,548 1,144
43% 0%
34%
49%
27% 77%
3
0
827
906
43% 0%
75%
29%
49%
Illinois Northern
2016
40 12 94,610 47,424 62,782
10
2
4,263
25% 17%
9%
38%
11
4 58,658 12,669
28% 33%
62%
27%
51%
Indiana Southern
2017 (Est.)
6
7 *** 11,532 15,826
1
0 ***
548
617
17% 0% ***
5%
4% 20%
3
2 ***
3,045
50% 29% ***
26%
51%

D el t a
DJ

2010-17

3%
0%

0%
17%

0%
33%

12%
-4%

8%
0%

4%
-1%

6%
17%

0%
14%

5%
2%

0%
14%

Most
2017 2017 Recent
2010
DJ
MJ Bar Data Census

ABA

State
Pop

Alabama Northern
2016 (Act.)
13 5 18,112 9,116 14,717
1 2 1,512
582 1,163
8% 40%
8%
6%
8% 34%
5 1 5,844
278
38% 20%
32%
35%
52%
Arizona
2017 (Est.)
22 14 18,486 11,542 14,960
6 2
563 3,155
27% 14%
5%
21% 44%
4 7 6,655 2,964
18% 50%
36%
26%
50%
California Central
2017
33 25 105,335 112,338 168,746
14 6 22,241 12,622
42% 24%
21%
11%
62%
6 12 36,807 35,100
18% 48%
41%
31%
50%
California Southern
2017
18 11 105,335 112,338 168,746
4 0 22,241 12,622
22% 0%
21%
11%
62%
4 4 36,807 35,100
22% 36%
41%
31%
50%
Delaware
2016 (Est.)
5 3 ***
2,099 2,978
1 0 ***
83
655
20% 0% ***
4%
13% 64%
1 2 ***
665
20% 67% ***
32%
53%
Florida Northern
2016 (Est.)
8 4 86,977 45,482 77,008
1 0 92,196 1,975 9,241
13% 0%
16%
4%
12% 44%
1 1 33,051 12442
13% 25%
38%
27%
51%
Georgia Northern
2016
16 9 *** 20,593 31,672
2 2 ***
2,179
13% 22% ***
11%
46%
3 3 ***
5,540
19% 33% ***
27%
51%
Idaho
2013
3 2 ***
2,538 3,836
0 0 ***
64
0% 0% ***
3%
17%
0 1 ***
645
0% 50% ***
25%
50%
Illinois Southern
2016
5 3 94,610 47,424 62,782
1 1
4,263
20% 33%
9%
38%
2 1 58,658 12,669
40% 33%
62%
27%
51%
Iowa Northern
2016
5 2 7,528 5,576 7,523
0 0
168
0% 0%
3%
13%
1 0
1235
20% 0%
22%
50%

D elt a
DJ

2010-17

0%
5%

7%
12%

4%
-7%

-2%
4%

3%
3%

-2%
-2%

11%
6%

0%
0%

17%
33%

0%
0%

Most
2017 2017 Recent
2010
DJ
MJ Bar Data Census

ABA

State
Pop

Alabama Southern
2016 (Act.)
4 3 18,112 9,116 14,717
0 1 1,512
582 1,163
0% 33%
8%
6%
8% 34%
2 2 5,844
278
50% 67%
32%
35%
52%
Arkansas Eastern
2017
8 5 ***
4,219 6,851
1 1 ***
194
13% 20% ***
5%
27%
2 2 ***
1,009
25% 40% ***
24%
51%
California Eastern
2017
11 12 105,335 112,338 168,746
6 0 22,241 12,622
55% 0%
21%
11%
62%
1 7 36,807 35,100
9% 58%
41%
31%
50%
Colorado
2017
11 9 26,300 14,390 22,164
4 2 ***
523
36% 22% ***
4%
31%
2 3 9,793
4,078
18% 33% 37%
28%
50%
District of Columbia
2017 (Act.)
25 3
11,872 54,692
9 1 10,938 1,902 2,461
36% 33%
20%
16%
5% 64%
10 2
4,708
40% 67%
40%
53%
Florida Southern
2016 (Est.)
27 16 86,977 45,482 77,008
7 4 92,196 1,975 9,241
26% 25%
16%
4%
12% 44%
8 5 33,051 12442
30% 31%
38%
27%
51%
Georgia Southern
2016
4 3 ***
20,593 31,672
0 0 ***
2,179
0% 0% ***
11%
46%
1 0 ***
5,540
25% 0% ***
27%
51%
Illinois Central
2016
8 3 94,610 47,424 62,782
1 1
4,263
13% 33%
9%
38%
2 1 58,658 12,669
25% 33%
62%
27%
51%
Indiana Northern
2017 (Est.)
8 4 ***
11,532 15,826
1 0 ***
548
617
13% 0% ***
5%
4% 20%
1 1 ***
3,045
13% 25% ***
26%
51%
Iowa Southern
2016
8 3 7,528 5,576 7,523
0 0
198
168
0% 0%
3%
3%
13%
2 2 2183 1235
14% 67%
29%
22%
50%

D elt a
DJ

2010-17

0%
17%

-1%
11%

22%
2%

9%
-9%

10%
6%

-3%
9%

0%
0%

-4%
8%

0%
0%

0%
14%
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Most
2017 2017 Recent 2010
DJ
MJ Bar Data Census

ABA

State
Pop

Kansas
2016
Total
9 5 ***
7,260 8,218
Total Non-White
2 1 ***
289
% Non White
22% 20% ***
4%
23%
Total Female
2 2 ***
1593
% Female
22% 40% ***
22%
50%
Louisiana Eastern
2017
Total
15 5 *** 13,798 19,307
Total Non-White
2 1 ***
1,184
% Non White
13% 20% ***
9%
41%
Total Female
6 2 ***
3,095
% Female
40% 40% ***
22%
51%
Maine
2016
Total
6 2 ***
2,886 3,940
Total Non-White
0 0 ***
47
% Non White
0% 0% ***
2%
6%
Total Female
1 0 ***
755
% Female
17% 0% ***
26%
51%
Michigan Eastern
2016 (Act.)
Total
31 7 34,637 22,915 35,236
Total Non-White
6 2 4,121 1,840 2,784
% Non White
19% 29% 12%
8%
8% 24%
Total Female
8 4 11,495 5,926
% Female
26% 57% 33% 26%
51%
Mississippi Northern
2017 (Est.)
Total
5 3 9,115 5,373 7,067
Total Non-White
1 0 1,748
458 1,067
% Non White
20% 0% 19%
9% 15% 43%
Total Female
2 1 2,697 1,278
% Female
40% 33% 30% 24%
51%
Missouri Western
2017 (Est.)
Total
13 5 *** 13,466 24,787
Total Non-White
2 1 ***
782 2,528
% Non White
15% 20% ***
6% 10% 20%
Total Female
3 1 ***
3,424
% Female
23% 20% ***
25%
51%
Nevada
2016
Total
12 7 8,916 4,717 7,281
Total Non-White
3 0
304
% Non White
25% 0%
6%
49%
Total Female
3 3 2,942 1,178
% Female
23% 43% 33% 25%
50%
New Mexico
2017 (Act.)
Total
10 10 7,203 5,207 5,524
Total Non-White
4 1
1,157 1,547
% Non White
40% 10%
22% 28% 61%
Total Female
3 4 2,213 1,617
% Female
30% 40% 31% 31%
50%
New York Southern
2016
Total
45 14 71,000 92,921 177,035
Total Non-White 11 2 8,073 10,666
% Non White
24% 14% 11% 11%
43%
Total Female
7 6 26,270 31,230
% Female
16% 43% 37% 34%
51%
North Carolina Middle
2017 (Act.)
Total
6 3 11,675 14,585 23,694
Total Non-White
2 0 1,583 1,168 8,473
% Non White
33% 0% 14%
8% 36% 36%
Total Female
2 1 5,067 4,051
% Female
33% 33% 43% 28%
51%

D elt a
DJ

2010-17

Most
2017 2017 Recent 2010
DJ MJ Bar Data Census

ABA

State
Pop

Kentucky Eastern 2017
8 4 17,262 8,257 13,509
1 0
690
186
0% 13% 0%
4%
2%
15%
1 1 7,164 2,021
0% 13% 25% 42% 24%
51%
Louisiana Middle
2017
4 2 *** 13,798 19,307
1 0 ***
1,184
7% 25% 0% ***
9%
41%
1 1 ***
3,095
21% 25% 50% ***
22%
51%
Maryland
2016
17 9 *** 28,869 38,800
3 1 ***
4,010
0% 18% 11% ***
14%
47%
4 2 ***
9,601
17% 24% 22% ***
33%
52%
Michigan Western
2016 (Act.)
5 4 34,637 22,915 35,236
0 0 4,121 1,840 2,784
5% 0% 0% 12%
8%
8% 24%
1 2 11,495 5,926
8% 20% 50% 33% 26%
51%
Mississippi Southern
2017 (Est.)
10 5 9,115 5,373 7,067
3 1 1,748
458 1,067
20% 30% 20% 19%
9%
15% 43%
0 1 2,697 1,278
23% 0% 20% 30% 24%
51%
Montana
2016
7 3 3,458 2,274 3,159
0 0
104
67
5% 0% 0%
3%
3%
13%
1 0 1,556
574
5% 14% 0% 45% 25%
50%
New Hampshire
2017
4 2
3,507
0 0
98
13% 0% 0%
3%
9%
1 1 1,877
879
13% 25% 50% 34% 29%
51%
New York Eastern
2016
30 15 71,000 92,921 177,035
8 2 8,073 10,666
10% 27% 13% 11% 11%
43%
8 7 26,270 31,230
0% 27% 47% 37% 34%
51%
New York Western
2016
9 7 71,000 92,921 177,035
0 0 8,073 10,666
5% 0% 0% 11% 11%
43%
1 1 26,270 31,230
7% 11% 14% 37% 34%
51%
Western North Carolina 2017 (Act.)
6 3 11,675 14,585 23,694
0 0 1,583 1,168 8,473
13% 0% 0% 14%
8%
36% 36%
0 0 5,067 4,051
13% 0% 0% 43% 28%
51%

D elt a
DJ

2010-17

Most
2017 2017 Recent 2010
DJ MJ Bar Data Census
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ABA

State
Pop

Kentucky Western
2017
5 4 17,262 8,257 13,509
0 0
690
186
4% 0% 0%
4%
2%
15%
0 0 7163.7 2,021
-5% 0% 0% 42% 24%
51%
Louisiana Western
2017
10 6 *** 13,798 19,307
0 0 ***
1,184
-15% 0% 0% ***
9%
41%
3 3 ***
3,095
25% 30% 50% ***
22%
51%
Massachusetts
2017
18 7 *** 29,470 43,442
2 0 ***
1,373
10% 11% 0% ***
5%
26%
5 5 ***
9,418
-1% 28% 71% ***
32%
52%
Minnesota
2017
12 8 25,229 14,510 25,483
2 2 1,658
544
0% 17% 25%
7%
4%
19%
4 3 9,312 4,065
3% 33% 38% 37% 28%
50%
Missouri Eastern
2017 (Est.)
15 7 *** 13,466 24,787
5 3 ***
782 2,528
3% 33% 43% ***
6% 10% 20%
5 5 ***
3,424
0% 33% 71% ***
25%
51%
Nebraska
2017
7 3
643 3,818 5,545
0 0
38
78
0% 0% 0%
6%
2%
20%
1 2
229
872
14% 14% 67% 36% 23%
50%
New Jersey
2016
24 13 *** 37,110 41,168
8 2 ***
3,294
0% 33% 15% ***
9%
43%
9 6 *** 10,181
20% 38% 46% ***
27%
51%
New York Northern
2016
9 6 71,000 92,921 177,035
0 0 8,073 10,666
6% 0% 0% 11% 11%
43%
2 1 26,270 31,230
8% 22% 17% 37% 34%
51%
North Carolina Eastern
2017 (Act.)
6 4 11,675 14,585 23,694
0 0 1,583 1,168 8,473
0% 0% 0% 14%
8% 36% 36%
1 1 5,067 4,051
13% 17% 25% 43% 28%
51%
North Dakota
2016
3 2 ***
1,495 1,698
0 0 ***
394
0% 0% 0% ***
18%
13%
0 1 ***
270
0% 0% 50% ***
26%
49%
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0%
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0%
0%

4%
-1%

1%
2%

8%
-9%

0%
0%

3%
12%

0%
22%

0%
0%

0%
0%
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State
Pop

Ohio Northern
2017 (Est.)
Total
14 7 *** 28,813 38,623
Total Non-White
2 1 ***
1,432 3,090
% Non White
14% 14% ***
5%
8% 20%
Total Female
4 1 ***
6,934
% Female
29% 14% ***
24%
51%
Oklahoma Northern
2016
Total
5 2 17,822 8,688 13,470
Total Non-White
0 0
643
% Non White
0% 0%
7%
33%
Total Female
1 0 5,866 2,171
% Female
20% 0% 33% 25%
50%
Pennsylvania Eastern
2016
Total
39 10 *** 36,516 49,406
Total Non-White
9 1 ***
2,360
% Non White
23% 10% ***
6%
22%
Total Female
7 5 ***
9,924
% Female
18% 50% ***
27%
51%
Puerto Rico
2016
Total
9 4 *** 14,183 14,293
Total Non-White
9 3 ***
7,681
% Non White
100% 75% ***
54%
***
Total Female
2 2 ***
4,563
% Female
22% 50% ***
32%
***
South Dakota
Total
7 4 ***
1,302 1,933
Total Non-White
0 0 ***
39
% Non White
0% 0% ***
3%
17%
Total Female
1 2 ***
273
% Female
14% 50% ***
21%
50%
Tennessee Western
2017 (Act.)
Total
7 4 *** 11,779 18,461
Total Non-White
1 2 ***
703
923
% Non White
14% 50% ***
6%
5% 25%
Total Female
1 2 ***
3,228
% Female
14% 50% ***
27%
51%
Texas Southern
2017 (Est.)
Total
27 15 100,294 57,891 89,361
Total Non-White 12 4 18,924 8,266 16,889
% Non White
44% 27% 19% 14% 19% 56%
Total Female
10 7 35,037 15,686
% Female
37% 47% 35% 27%
50%
Vermont
2015
Total
4 1 ***
1,863 2,326
Total Non-White
0 0 ***
28
% Non White
0% 0% ***
2%
6%
Total Female
1 0 ***
592
% Female
25% 0% ***
32%
51%
Washington Eastern
2016 (Est.)
Total
10 2 25,708 16,591 25,786
Total Non-White
1 0 3,143 1,304 2,475
% Non White
10% 0% 12%
8% 10% 30%
Total Female
1 1 11,959 4,766
% Female
10% 50% 47% 29%
50%
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Ohio Southern
2017 (Est.)
12 7 *** 28,813 38,623
1 0 ***
1,432 3,090
-2% 8% 0% ***
5%
8% 20%
2 6 ***
6,934
-5% 17% 86% ***
24%
51%
Oklahoma Western
2016
10 5 17,822 8,688 13,470
1 1
643
0% 10% 20%
7%
33%
2 1 5,866 2,171
0% 20% 20% 33% 25%
50%
Pennsylvania Middle
2016
13 5 *** 36,516 49,406
0 0 ***
2,360
4% 0% 0% ***
6%
22%
2 2 ***
9,924
2% 15% 40% ***
27%
51%
Rhode Island
2017
4 2 ***
3,387 4,167
0 0 ***
69
0% 0% 0% ***
2%
25%
1 1 ***
784
2% 25% 50% ***
23%
52%
Tennessee Eastern
2017 (Act.)
7 5 *** 11,779 18,461
1 0 ***
703
923
0% 14% 0% ***
6%
5% 25%
1 1 ***
3,228
0% 14% 20% ***
27%
51%
Texas Eastern
2017 (Est.)
7 8 100,294 57,891 89,361
0 0 18,924 8,266 16,889
-3% 0% 0% 19% 14%
19% 56%
1 4 35,037 15,686
-3% 14% 50% 35% 27%
50%
Texas Western
2017 (Est.)
14 13 100,294 57,891 89,361
6 4 18,924 8,266 16,889
13% 43% 31% 19% 14%
19% 56%
2 2 35,037 15,686
5% 14% 15% 35% 27%
50%
Virginia Eastern
2017
19 9 24,249 32,679 23,249
4 2 2,182 3,897
0% 21% 22%
9% 12%
29%
4 1 8,730 10,012
0% 21% 11% 36% 31%
51%
Washington Western
2016 (Est.)
13 6 25,708 16,591 25,786
2 0 3,143 1,304 2,475
10% 15% 0% 12%
8%
10% 30%
3 2 11,959 4,766
-4% 23% 33% 47% 29%
50%
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Oklahoma Eastern
2016
3 2 17,822 8,688 13,470
1 0
643
1% 33% 0%
7%
33%
0 1 5,866 2,171
2% 0% 50% 33% 25%
50%
Oregon
2017 (Est.)
12 10 15,011 8,142 12,227
2 2 9,837
297 1,162
0% 17% 20%
7%
4% 10% 23%
2 4 3,656 2,059
0% 17% 40% 24% 25%
51%
Pennsylvania Western
2016
12 5 *** 36,516 49,406
1 0 ***
2,360
0% 8% 0% ***
6%
22%
4 4 ***
9,924
0% 33% 80% ***
27%
51%
South Carolina
2016 (Act.)
15 8
6,655 10,316
2 3
511
609
0% 13% 38%
8%
6% 36%
5 5
1,616
0% 33% 63% 32% 24%
51%
Tennessee Middle
2017 (Act.)
8 3
11,779 18,461
2 0
703
923
-1% 25% 0%
6%
5% 25%
1 2
3,228
13% 13% 67%
27%
51%
Texas Northern
2017 (Est.)
13 9 100,294 57,891 89,361
1 2 18,924 8,266 16,889
0% 8% 22% 19% 14% 19% 56%
3 2 35,037 15,686
0% 23% 22% 35% 27%
50%
Utah
2017
10 5 4,084 4,854 8,204
0 0
245
242
3% 0% 0%
6%
5%
21%
2 2
245
902
0% 20% 40% 24% 19%
50%
Virginia Western
2017
5 3 24,249 32,679 23,249
0 0 2,182 3,897
5% 0% 0%
9% 12%
29%
0 1 8,730 10,012
10% 0% 33% 36% 31%
51%
West Virginia Northern 2016 (Est.)
4 3 ***
3,951 4,862
0 0 ***
92
875
-6% 0% 0% ***
2% 18% 8%
2 0 ***
1,092
2% 50% 0% ***
28%
51%
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2010-17

0%
0%

8%
-10%

-5%
11%

-7%
11%

0%
0%

0%
0%

0%
-2%

0%
17%

0%
25%
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West Virginia Southern 2016 (Est.)
Total
6 3 3,951 ***
4,862
Total Non-White
1 2
92 ***
875
% Non White
17% 67%
2% ***
18% 8%
Total Female
1 0 1,092 ***
% Female
17% 0% 28% ***
51%
Wyoming
2017
Total
3 4 2,935 390 1,776
Total Non-White
0 0
41
% Non White
0% 0%
3%
16%
Total Female
1 1
982 349
% Female
33% 25% 33% 29%
49%
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State
Pop
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2010-17

Wisconsin Eastern
Western Wisconsin
2016 (Est.)
2016 (Est.)
5 3 15,625 10,474 15,549
3 1 15,625 10,474 15,549
1 1 1,042
371 1,617
0 0 1,042
371 1,617
0% 20% 33%
7%
4% 10% 18% 0% 0% 0%
7%
4% 10% 18% 0%
1 1 6,096 2,672
1 0 6,096 2,672
0% 20% 33% 39% 26%
50% 17% 33% 0% 39% 26%
50% 0%

0%
8%

Criticism that the magistrate judge bench remains racially homogeneous
despite opportunities to diversity is valid. For example, despite the low bar
membership for non-whites in California, three of the federal districts have
district judge benches are made up of one-third or more non-white judges. The
fourth federal district has nearly one-quarter of its district judge bench made up
of non-white judges. Similarly, though Colorado’s bar population is made up of
about 96% white lawyers, the district judge bench is made up of 36% non-white
judges. This phenomenon of equaling or exceeding bar demographics occurred
in sixty-two77 of the ninety78 districts studied.
Though it may be surmised that courts with a racially diverse district judge
bench would have a racially diverse magistrate judge bench, this is not the case.
By strictly looking at the percentage of non-white district judges, the top fifteen
most racially diverse courts are: Puerto Rico (100%), California Eastern (60%),
Texas Western (50%), Texas Southern (44%), Hawaii (43%), California Central
(40%), New Mexico (40%), California Northern (38%), Colorado (36%),
District of Columbia (36%), Georgia Middle (33%), Missouri Eastern (33%),
North Carolina Middle (33%), Oklahoma Eastern (33%), and New Jersey
(33%).
Of the top fifteen most racially diverse district judge benches, six79 have only
white magistrate judges, and four80 have at least one-third of their magistrate
judge benches occupied by people of color. Seven of the fifteen most racially

77. Three districts exceeded or equaled the bar demographic numbers depending upon the statistic
considered; oddly, in these districts, the number reported to the ABA as to non-white membership
differed from that publicly reported.
78. Those districts that had fewer non-white district judges than the Bar statistics indicated included
Alaska, Arkansas Western, Florida Northern, Georgia Southern, Idaho, Iowa Southern, Iowa Northern,
Kentucky Western, Louisiana Western, Maine, Michigan Western, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New York Western, North Dakota, Oklahoma Northern, Pennsylvania Middle, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Texas Eastern, Utah, Vermont, Virginia Western, West Virginia Northern, Wisconsin Western,
and Wyoming.
79. California Eastern, Georgia Middle, Hawaii, North Carolina Middle, and Oklahoma Eastern
80. California Northern, District of Columbia, Missouri Eastern, and Puerto Rico
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diverse district judge benches have at least half of their magistrate judge bench
populated by women.
Of the top gender diverse district judge benches, six81 are also at the top of
the list for the most gender diverse magistrate judge benches. Thirty-one of the
ninety-one courts studied have 50% or more female magistrate judges. Oddly, of
the courts that have no district judges of color,82 the corresponding magistrate
judge benches83 are made up of 50% or more females.
Of the nineteen district judge benches where women occupy at least one-third
of the positions84, ten of the corresponding magistrate judge benches have at least
33% of their positions occupied by people of color.
D. Conclusion
District judge benches that are made up of a higher percentage of people of
color or women do not ensure that the corresponding magistrate judge bench will
have a higher percentage of judges that are non-white or female. However, courts
that have a district judge bench that is well-populated by women and/or nonwhite judges, have at least one female magistrate even when the bench is
primarily non-diverse. Courts with a racially diverse district judge bench do not
uniformly have a racially diverse magistrate judge bench. In the fifteen courts in
which the district judge bench has at least one-third non-white judges, five have
no people of color on their corresponding magistrate judge bench. Thus, it is not
the color of the skin or the gender of the district judges that drives diversity; it is
the collective will of the individual courts to prioritize diversity.
IV
SELECTION OF FEDERAL TRIAL JUDGES
A. Selection of District Judges
The selection of a district judge is a political process. The senator for the
district where the opening lies is generally entitled to select a candidate to present
for the President’s approval and, if appropriate, nomination. Before the senator
81. Pennsylvania Western (80%), Missouri Eastern (71%), Alabama Southern (67%), California
Northern (67%), District of Columbia (67%), and South Carolina (63%)
82. Alabama Southern, Alaska, Arkansas Western, Georgia Southern, Idaho, Iowa Northern, Iowa
Southern, Kentucky Western, Louisiana Western, Maine, Michigan Western, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New York Northern, New York Western, North Carolina Eastern, North Carolina Western,
North Dakota, Oklahoma Northern, Pennsylvania Middle, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas Eastern,
Utah, Vermont, Virginia Western, West Virginia Northern, Wisconsin Western, and Wyoming
83. Alabama Southern (67%), Iowa Southern (67%), Nebraska (67%), Alaska (50%), Idaho
(50%,) Louisiana Western (50%), Michigan Western (50%), New Hampshire (50%), North Dakota
(50%), Rhode Island (50%), South Dakota (50%), and Texas Eastern (50%)
84. Alabama Southern (50%), Indiana Southern (50%), West Virginia Northern (50%), Hawaii
(43%), District of Columbia (40%), Illinois Southern (40%), Louisiana Eastern (40%), Mississippi
Northern (38%), Alabama Northern (38%), New Jersey (38%), Texas Southern (37%), California
Northern (33%), Minnesota (33%), Missouri Eastern (33%), North Carolina Middle (33%),
Pennsylvania Western (33%), South Carolina (33%), Wisconsin Western (33%), and Wyoming (33%).
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begins the selection process, the President makes his wishes known about the
type of person he would like to nominate.85 This can include information about
judicial philosophy, demographic characteristics, and political party. It is
uncommon for a senator to nominate a person of a political party that is contrary
to that of the President’s, even when the President’s political party is different
from the senator’s. Frequently, the senator’s staff members contact potential
candidates with the right mix of experience, demographics, and political savvy, to
encourage application.
Most senators maintain a Judicial Advisory Committee made up of lawyers,
laypersons of political heft, law professors, and others with an interest in the
judiciary. This committee, made up of up to ten or more members, culls through
the applicants’ materials and proposes the top candidates for the senator’s
consideration. The exact process varies from senator to senator and is generally
a well-kept secret. Unless you have been through it or know someone who has,
exactly what happens and how it happens is a mystery.

85. In 2008, the Los Angeles Times published a story detailing the agreement between the California
senators and the Bush Administration, in which Senators Feinstein and Boxer agreed to recommend no
candidates from the extreme right or left. Rather, candidates would fall “between the 45 yard lines,”
meaning they would have relatively centrist views. Henry Weinstein, Process of Judge Selection Set Up,
L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2001, http://articles.latimes.com/2001/may/30/local/me-4193 [https://perma.cc/
4AP3-T5S7]. Likewise, in 2013, President Obama made clear his desire to appoint “firsts.” Philip Rucker,
Obama pushing to diversify federal judiciary amid GOP delays, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-pushing-to-diversify-federal-judiciary-amid-gopdelays/2013/03/03/16f7d2067aab11e29a75dab0201670da_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9a6f388
b7cca [https://perma.cc/NH47-U9B5]. At that time, President Obama had nominated the first openly gay
black man to the district court. Id. Before that, he had nominated the first lesbian Asian American
candidate for a district judge position. Id. In addition, he proposed the first South Asian to the D.C.
Circuit. Id. Thus, it was apparent that he favored candidates from underrepresented groups. The Post
author quoted White House Counsel, Kathryn Ruemmler when she said, “Diversity in and of itself is a
thing that is strengthening the judicial system. It enhances the bench and the performance of the bench
and the quality of the discussion.” Id.
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Figure 7: The Selection Process for District Judge

The selection process includes reference checking and other investigation by
the Committee. It is common for one or more members of the Committee to
contact judicial officers of the district to ferret out opinions about the candidates.
A candidate who is not well-liked by the judicial officers is unlikely to do well in
the process. However, this process does not promote cronyism because feelings
of the court notwithstanding, the senator is obligated to propose a candidate the
President will endorse. A candidate with political influence, regardless of
whether he is known to or liked by the court, may succeed.
The Committee must craft its investigation toward selecting candidates who
meet the senator’s and President’s preferred qualities. It has broad authority to
identify the top candidates with these qualities and, though legal skill is a key
factor, the most brilliant legal mind may not always succeed. Often the
Committee selects three top candidates and ranks them. Regardless of the
ranking, the senator selects the preferred candidate. It is common for candidates
to benefit from political pressure being brought to bear and it can make the
difference as to the one appointed ultimately.
Once the senator makes the selection, the candidate is forwarded to White
House Counsel. A member of the Department of Justice is assigned, in part to
assist and in part to vet, the candidate. A portion of this process includes
completing the “United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees.” This requires the candidate to submit a
huge volume of detailed information related to legal experience, finances,
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sources of conflicts, legal writings and public speeches. The candidate must
provide all writings issued for years before the selection and must submit to a
medical examination.
Assuming the responses to the questionnaire do not raise too many concerns,
the candidate is referred to the ABA for further vetting. The ABA seeks surveys
members about the candidate. Simultaneously, the FBI conducts an exhaustive
background check. Also, the candidate submits to an interview with White House
Counsel who, in general, wields the authority of the President to refuse to
advance the candidate further.
Assuming the candidate receives a passing recommendation from the ABA
and there are no skeletons uncovered by the FBI, the President makes the
nomination. After this, the Senate Judiciary Committee may schedule the
candidate for a hearing or may require additional information. Eventually,
however, the candidate will receive a hearing, and if favorable an “up or down”
vote by the Senate. If the candidate receives a majority vote, the President
formally appoints the person to the judgeship.
B. Selection of Magistrate Judges
The process of selecting magistrate judges differs dramatically. Rather than
requiring an act of Congress, district judges are charged with the obligation to
select their court’s magistrate judges. The process is intended to be merit-based
with little leeway for political maneuvering; in practice, however, often the ingroup remains in, and the out-group remains out. Though permitting sufficient
flexibility for courts to select a magistrate judge who can fill the district’s needs,
the process for selecting magistrate judges can cause significant variability in the
effectiveness of the tools designed to ensure equal access to these positions
regardless of the applicant’s demographic backgrounds.
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Figure 8: The Selection Process for Magistrate Judges

The process of obtaining approval to fill a magistrate judge position can be
challenging depending upon the caseload statistics of the district. Once the
district is given this authority, it is obligated to publicize it widely.86 How to meet
this public notice requirement is largely left to the district, which can choose to
rely on electronic notice via their web page or other, more traditional methods.87
The Administrative Office urges districts to consider avenues that will attract
the greatest number of qualified applicants without regard for their gender, race,
color, age (over forty), disability, religion, or national origin.88 The AO also
encourages the district to consider notice to minority bar associations and other
underrepresented community groups that are likely to have members who are
qualified for the position.89 The AO invites courts to actively encourage
applicants from underrepresented groups.90

86. THE SELECTION, APPOINTMENT AND REAPPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
JUDGES 13 (Judicial Services Office Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Oct. 2016)
[hereinafter MAGISTRATE JUDGE SELECTION REPORT], http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/Selection_and_Appointment_of_Magistrate_Judges_Oct-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TKS3-PQCC].
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 14.
90. Id.
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More than half of the responding chief judges reported that they comply with
this guidance and provide the job posting to minority and specialty bar groups,
and also made direct contact with women and minorities to encourage them to
apply. One-third of the responding chief judges reported they target women and
minorities when they advertise the position. About one-fourth spoke to minority
and female lawyer groups about judicial openings, but nearly one fourth were
unaware of any efforts to inform candidates of diverse backgrounds about the
opening.
About 57% of the current magistrate judges learned of the opening before
they applied through word-of-mouth. Twenty-six percent learned of the opening
through direct contact by a court member. Of these, 70% were white and about
half were men. Another 25% learned of the opening through the court’s website,
and only 8% learned of the opening through a specialty bar association
publication.
Part of the official job posting provides information about how to apply and
includes a job application or a requirement that the applicant submit a curriculum
vitae or both.91 Notably, the “sample” application form offered by the AO does
not have space for the applicant to note demographic information, except
obliquely when asking whether the applicant has become naturalized.92
1. The Merit Selection Panel
The first substantive step toward culling the applicant pool is performed by a
merit selection panel. This panel has enormous power to determine which
applicants to reject, which to interview and, ultimately, which candidates can be
considered by the judges of the district. The report the panel submits to the
district includes its reasons for advancing the final five, but no explanation as to
why the panel did not advance the other applicants. Consequently, the implicit
and explicit biases of the panel members can play a determinative role in whether
a candidate advances in the process. Despite this, panel members receive
inconsistent instruction and training for completing their work.
The chief district judge must appoint a merit selection panel, headed by a
chairperson, to reduce the candidate pool to the five most qualified.93 The panel
members must reside in or have significant ties to the district.94 Courts are
directed to appoint a demographically diverse panel.95
Only one panelist surveyed recalled serving on a panel that did not include a
woman, while 56% recalled serving on a panel that had between one and five
91. Id.
92. Id. at 63.
93. Id. at 18, 23–24, 28–31. However, the court may choose to use the same merit selection panel to
evaluate candidates for more than one position or the court may maintain a standing panel.
94. Id. at 17.
95. Id. at 18. Notably, in January 2018, Senators Kamala Harris (CA) and Cory Booker (NJ), both
Democrats, were appointed to the Senate Judiciary Committee. They represent only the second and third
African American ever to serve on this committee. The first was Senator Carol Moseley Braun (IL)—
also a Democrat—who served on the Committee in the 1990s.
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female members. About 44% had between three and five female members.
About 10% of the panelists recalled serving on a panel with no non-whites. In
contrast, about 22% recalled one non-white member, about 15% recalled two
non-white members, and about 16% recalled there were four non-white members
on the panel. The panel must include at least seven members made up of at least
five lawyers and at least two non-lawyers.96 The greatest percentage, nearly 40%,
served on a panel that included eleven or more members.
Though most of the panelists had served only on one panel, more than 27%
had served on three or more panels. About 10% served on ten or more selection
panels. More than 40% served within the prior twenty-one months, though 50%
served between one and three years prior. About 81% had not served as a
chairperson of a panel.
The first meeting of the panel is informational.97 Because districts use
magistrate judges in different ways, a judge is permitted to attend to provide
insight into the unique court requirements of the job98 and the screening criteria.99
However, the exact process varies from district-to-district. About half of the chief
judges indicated they provided written materials and oral guidance only to the
chairperson of the panel. The rest provided guidance to the entire panel and
provided oral instruction and written materials. For one-quarter of the panels,
the initial meeting lasted more than an hour, but most of these meetings, if they
occurred at all, were less than one hour. For about twenty percent of the panelists,
the oral component of the training was a mere direction to read the written
materials.
If the court anticipates that the position will focus on a particular area of law,
the chief judge emphasizes this so it can be a significant concern for the panelists
when selecting the finalists. Panelists recalled the great bulk of the training
focused on the basic information about the job and the desired qualifications the
successful candidate would possess.
Though nearly 97% of the chief judges agreed it was important to select
diverse members of the merit selection panel, about 84% reported they did not
provide training to the panel to understand the implications of implicit bias.
Nearly 68% did not provide instruction on the importance of diversity on the
bench though about 78% did provided training on how to value diversity when
evaluating applicants.
Past merit selection panelists confirmed this. Less than 20% reported
receiving any information about implicit bias, but nearly 80% recalled receiving
some guidance about how to consider diversity when evaluating the candidates.

96. Id. at 17. For the appointment of a part-time magistrate judge, the panel must include at least
three members and may include senior, active or retired district judges, active, recalled or retired
magistrate judges, bankruptcy judges or court staff. The panel must include two members from outside
the court.
97. Id. at 23.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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Most panelists recalled that the focus of the initial meeting was on the expected
qualifications of the successful candidate, basic information about the position,
interview techniques for meeting with the applicants, and the criteria to apply
when selecting the finalists.
At the first meeting, the panel discusses and determines the procedures it will
use for the selection process, for example, whether it will use secret balloting,
whether there will be an attendance requirement, whether voting may occur in
absentia, the rules to establish a quorum, and whether each panel member will
have a role in the initial screening of the applicants.100 The panel must also
establish a methodology for evaluating qualitative characteristics.101 The panel
may conduct further investigation into the qualifications of the applicant.102
Though panel is not obligated to interview the candidates, if it chooses to do so,
it must establish in advance the questions to be asked to ensure a uniform
process.103
The panel’s objective is to select the top five individuals it determines are best
suited to the needs of the job.104 Given the increasing regularity with which
district judges are selected from the magistrate judge bench, the panel is charged
with examining the applicant’s qualities as if it were selecting a district court
judge.105 The panel is required to evaluate the applicant’s experience, including
the areas of practice, past scholarship, professional competence, the ability to
address complex legal issues, writing skill, reputation, and community
involvement, including pro bono and public service work.106 The panel may
consider the applicant’s familiarity with the district and its systems as well as its
rules.107 The panel must select those of high moral integrity, steady temperament,
and a demonstrated commitment to the goal of justice.108 Though there is no
requirement to favor minority applicants, the panel is obligated “to give due
consideration to all qualified applicants for a magistrate judge position,
particularly those from underrepresented groups.”109
The merit selection panel process is strictly confidential.110 The panel may
reveal only that information necessary to fully report to the court and the panel’s
deliberations may not be revealed.111 Much like a jury deliberation, the panel
100. Id. at 23–24.
101. Id. at 29.
102. Id. at 26. Except where the application contains information gaps that impact the panel’s
decision making, the panel is not obligated to conduct more than a cursory investigation because the
selected candidate will undergo a full and extensive FBI and IRS background check.
103. Id. at 24.
104. Id. at 33.
105. Id. at 28.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 29.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 31.
110. Id. at 25. However, the names of the entire pool of applicants may be revealed to the judges of
the court.
111. Id.
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discusses the candidates and members can each provide analysis.112 The panel’s
discussion is to be robust and to fully consider the qualities of each applicant.113
The panel must identify the top five candidates unless the quality of the applicant
pool is such that this cannot occur.114 Rather than voting on a pool of top
candidates, the panel is obligated to vote on each candidate individually. To make
it to the “final five,”115 the applicant must receive a positive vote from a majority
of the panel.116
One Chief Judge ruminated that “horse trading” likely occurs during this
process. “If you vote for my candidate, I’ll vote for yours.” Exactly how and
whether this impacts the selection of diverse candidates is hard to know, but as
the data reveals, the court and some of the panelists generally have experience
with the candidates who move forward in the process. Notably, about 24% of the
current sitting magistrate judges worked for the United States Attorney’s Office
before receiving the appointment to the bench, and about 4% worked for the
United States Federal Defender’s office. About 43% worked in a federal
clerkship position in the past.117
Most magistrate judges worked in private practice or in a government office
that required practice in federal court. Only ten out of the 307 magistrate judges
had not practiced in federal court, and one had insignificant experience. Of this
group, five were women and six were men. One of the men is African American.
The remaining 297 magistrate judges had substantial federal court experience.
Within ninety days of appointment, the panel must report its five selections.118
Seventy-eight percent reported they believed the members followed the guidance
given by the court. In the last ten years, one-third of the courts received a group
of finalists that included a woman more than five times; one-third received a
group of finalists that included a woman twice. Four courts had this happen four
times, one court had this happen three times, and four courts had this happen
only once.119
112. Id. at 33.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 34. If the applicant pool is insufficient, the court may make efforts toward further
recruitment. If this occurs, the panel report is still due within 90 days from their appointment.
115. If the panel is filling two positions, it must identify at least six candidates (so that five candidates
remain once the first position is filled) or the panel may be directed to determine the top ten candidates;
five for each position. Id.
116. Id.
117. Law clerks could prove to be a significant source for identifying future magistrate judge
candidates. Sixty-nine percent of magistrate judges agreed that their courts encouraged them to hire law
clerks that are diverse in terms of race and gender but only 29% did this explicitly. The chief judges
agreed with this for the most part. About 53% of the chief judges reported that their courts encouraged
hiring law clerks of diverse backgrounds though only 13% stated that this came in the form of explicit
encouragement.
118. MAGISTRATE JUDGE SELECTION REPORT, supra note 86, at 19.
119. Thus, most of the merit selection panels working from 2007 through 2017, found there was at
least one woman and at least one person of color whose qualifications placed them in the top five of those
considered for the judicial position. On a micro level, the degree to which significance can attach to this
data, however, depends on the number of times each of these courts filled a position during this period,
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Over the same period, 20% did not receive a group of finalists that included
a non-white applicant; 30% received a group of finalists that included a non-white
candidate one time. Seventeen percent of the courts received finalists with a nonwhite candidate twice, and one court had this happen three times. Ten percent of
the courts received a list of finalists with a non-white candidate four times, and
14% received such a list five or more times.120
The panel’s report must provide any additional information the process has
elicited that was not contained in the written materials provided by the
applicants.121 The panel may choose to report on the qualities it determined to be
most important, but it is not obligated to do so.122 The panel may choose to rank
the finalists.123
2. Court Selection
Once the court receives the panel’s report, it may make the selection based
only on the information received from the panel and the applicants, or it may
conduct a supplemental investigation.124 The court can, and usually does, conduct
interviews of the finalists.125 If the court determines the five top candidates are
not acceptable, the court may request the panel provide five additional names.126
In this event, the court must select the successful candidate from one of the two
lists provided by the panel.127
The active district judges and the senior district judges who carry at least a
fifty percent caseload are entitled to vote on the final selection.128 The selected
candidate must receive a majority vote of those entitled to vote.129 If no candidate
wins a majority vote, the chief district judge must make the selection.130
Chief district judges play a key role in selecting magistrate judges for their
districts. They select, appoint, and direct the members of the merit selection
panel—which would seem to provide them significant control over whether the
process yields selection of diverse candidates. However, the chief judges discount
this control and believe part of the reason the bench cannot be diversified is the
lack of buy-in from the other district judges. On scale of one to 100, on average,
but this data was not collected. Notably, in the 10 years preceding this research, of those Magistrate
Judges responding to the survey, 198 had been appointed within the last ten years; half were women and
half were men. Of the women appointed during this interval, 16 were non-white. Of the 99 males
appointed, 18 were non-white.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 33.
122. Id. at 34.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 37.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. Some courts include the magistrate judges in the selection process, though they are not
always allowed to vote.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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the chief judges rated the importance of having a diverse magistrate judge bench
as seventy-nine. However, they felt that their court valued diversity of the
magistrate judge bench only as a sixty-seven. One Chief Judge said, “You can
talk about gender, you can talk about race, but the judges say they need to select
the best candidate for the job and let the chips fall where they may.” In only one
instance did a chief judge indicate the court valued diversity on the magistrate
judge bench much more highly than the chief did.131
Current magistrate judges had a slightly different take. Like the chief judges,
on average, magistrate judges rated their own courts as a sixty-five on a scale of
one to 100 when considering how highly it valued diversity of the magistrate judge
bench. About one-fifth of magistrate judges graded their own court as a fortynine or below. Another one-fifth rated their courts at ninety or above. Of the 163
magistrate judges describing their own courts as valuing diversity more than the
average score of sixty-five, one-third were white men.
The chief district judges felt achieving diversity of the subordinate bench was
due, in no small part, to market forces. Seventy-five percent cited the lack of
qualified, diverse candidates as the primary impediment to diversifying the
bench. Fifty percent believed the need to hire the best-qualified candidate was a
secondary impediment to achieving diversity, and one-third cited the failure of
the merit selection panel to provide diverse candidates as a tertiary obstacle. The
nature of the job itself was cited by several chief judges as explanation why there
was not a more diverse candidate pool. One reported that despite the substantive
work done by magistrate judges, some lawyers still believed the position was
nothing more “than a glorified law clerk.” Others cited the loss of pay an
experienced private practitioner would suffer if appointed to the position as
explanation for the relatively shallow pool of applicants. This explains, one Chief
Judge reported, why courts receive so many applications from government
agencies; the salary of a magistrate judge is higher than that which government
lawyers generally receive. However, because district judges are paid only 8%
more than magistrate judges, this does not fully explain why people of diverse
backgrounds will leave private practice for appointment to the district judge
bench but won’t do so for appointment to the magistrate judge bench.
One judge opined women are more interested in the magistrate judge bench
because, due to family demands, they have not been on the partnership path for
a sufficiently long time to have earned a top salary. Another thought women do
well in the magistrate judge selection process because men—who still tend to be
the greatest demographic on the district judge bench—are comfortable having
131. Only considered here are those courts where the chief judge’s personal rating differed from the
rating the chief gave the court by 20 points or more. As to several courts, where data was provided by
both the chief judge and the members of the corresponding magistrate judge bench, the magistrate judges
on average felt that the court as a whole valued diversity much less—meaning they rated the value the
court placed on diversity 20 points or lower—than the chief judge. In a few instances, they felt the court
valued diversity of their bench much higher than the chief judge. For the most part, there were
insignificant differences between the value assessed by the chief and the average figures provided by the
magistrate judges.
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women as their subordinates but not as comfortable with people of color in this
role.
Notably, 30% of the responding chief judges reported their courts maintained
demographic data on every applicant for magistrate judge positions and 10%
maintained it as to the five finalists. One-third of the courts kept no data, and
nearly 27% were uncertain whether the court kept the data.
V
METHODS FOR CHANGE
Most of the chief judges interviewed expressed a commitment to diversity
though few knew how to achieve it. A few were interested in diversity but balked
at the idea of any “affirmative action” approach. A few advocated for a system
of color-blindness in which the best candidate was selected regardless of that
person’s race, religion, ethnicity, or gender. However, after studying the data and
talking with the chief judges, areas for improvement became clear.
The AO should maintain magistrate judge’s demographics on a district-bydistrict basis rather than holding it in the aggregate. Districts should be
encouraged to develop a culture of diversity that includes the entire court family,
including the clerk’s office, the probation and pretrial services offices and in law
clerk hiring in addition to the judges. Recruitment efforts should be standardized
and targeted to ensure the wide distribution of information about open judicial
positions. The prestige and pay for magistrate judges should be increased to
attract candidates. Courts should gather and track demographic data on the
judicial applicants to help to determine why more diverse applicants are not
selected. The merit selection panels should be made up of people of diverse
backgrounds and they should receive standardized training on key selection
issues. Finally, courts should be held accountable for their efforts toward
achieving diversity.
A. Gather and Maintain Court-by-Court Data
Despite consistent devotion of resources to the goal of diversity, the scope of
the problem is hard to understand due to the lack of data. Though each district is
required to report annually about the demographic makeup of their court and
the AO reports these findings, data regarding magistrate judges is available only
in the aggregate. This composite data provides no sure method of knowing which
courts are doing well and which courts are struggling to achieve diversity on the
subordinate bench. The reason for this opacity is not known, but, at least in some
instances, it frustrates change.
Some courts have dismal numbers in terms of diversity despite what appears
to be a hearty pipeline of diverse bar members. It is likely these courts have no
idea as to their relative lack of diversity. Making court-by-court data available,
peer pressure may encourage strengthened efforts toward achieving diversity.
This is particularly important for data related to magistrate judges because,
unlike district judges—whose demographics are readily available from the FJC—
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no entity tracks demographic data on magistrate judges except the AO, and as
noted above, reports the information only in the aggregate.
No entity in the federal or state systems seeks to determine the causes of the
lack of diversity. Rather, it appears that courts rely nearly exclusively on
anecdotal evidence to evaluate whether efforts should be expended on achieving
diversity goals and they tend to explain the failure to achieve parity with the
district judge bench by citing pipeline issues. However, review of the data
indicates that the pipeline explains the problem in only limited circumstances.
B. Encourage Diversity Throughout the Entire Court Family
The most diverse courts have focused not only on the diversity of the benches
but have determined that diversity must occur throughout, including in the clerk’s
office, in the probation office, in law clerks, and among support staff. A chief
judge from one of these courts reported that the concept of diversity is so
ingrained that instead of taking note when they have a diverse gathering, it is
remarkable to them only when they don’t. Courts that have developed a culture
of diversity invariably have a more diverse magistrate bench.
A chief judge from a district with a culture of diversity reported that the court
celebrates diversity by supporting minority bar associations—through the entire
bench actively attending events hosted by these groups—and in this way,
communicates a message that everyone is welcome in their court. By actively
engaging with the minority and female bars, the judges meet future candidates
for upcoming judicial vacancies and vice versa.
The idea of knowing candidates is a common theme in the hiring process for
magistrate judges. Most chief judges interviewed reported that though there is
not a formal policy of selecting those they know, this is a common practice. Of
the magistrate judges responding to the survey, nearly half clerked at some point
before their appointment to the bench. Despite this, most courts did not explicitly
encourage the selection of diverse law clerks. Though 53% of the chief district
judges reported their courts encouraged judges to hire non-white and female law
clerks, 40% indicated this encouragement was implicit only.
Nearly 30% of Magistrate Judges worked previously as an Assistant United
States Attorney or as an Assistant Deputy Federal Defender, but only 8% of
AUSAs are African American, only 5% are Latino and only 38% are female.132
Thus, part of the diversity problem is that the U.S. Attorneys’ offices consistently

132. Debbie Mukamal & David Alan Sklansky, Op-Ed, A study of California prosecutors finds a lack
of diversity, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 29, 2015, https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0729sklanskymukamal-diversity-prosecutors-california-20150729-story.html [https://perma.cc/7RPS-DDYF].
As of January 2018, President Trump had nominated new U.S Attorneys for 58 vacancies in the federal
districts. Of these, most were white men, three were women, and few were people of color. Jody Godoy,
Ex-US Attorneys Say Justice Best Served by Diverse Group, LAW360 (Jan. 12, 2018, 6:12 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1001193/ex-us-attys-say-justice-best-served-by-diverse-group
[https://perma.cc/S9KS-4REL].
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lack diversity and improving the diversity of these source offices can only
improve diversity of this bench in the long term. 133
The idea of requiring courts to select a specified number of female or nonwhite judges in the manner of a quota system has been questioned for decades.134
Several chief judges mentioned the peril of creating “the black seat” or the
“woman seat,” when filling the benches because, once filled, there is the belief
there is no need to consider another female or non-white for a new opening. This
type of tokenism was a topic of a 2016 podcast, “The Lady Vanishes,” produced
by Revisionist History.135 The podcast discusses the tragedy of “moral licensing”
in the context of gender bias. It suggested that breaking gender and racial barriers
does not necessarily pave the way for other women or people of color, but to the
contrary, provides moral justification to exclude others of these demographics.
The author posits, “You open the door to one outsider, and that gives you
permission to close the door to others.”
Recognizing a similar problem, famous Pittsburgh Steelers owner and onetime chair of the NFL’s diversity committee, Dan Rooney, revolutionized how
coaches are hired. To address the disconnect between the relatively large number
of black players but only few black coaches, Rooney developed a requirement
that one person of color must be interviewed for every open coaching position.136
Other sports organizations and companies like Xerox and Facebook, have
adopted the “Rooney Rule” in the hiring processes.
None of the chief judges interviewed who hired diverse magistrate judges, or
who wanted to do so, felt that quality needed to be compromised. If quality and
demographically diverse district judges can be selected, seemingly, there is no
need to compromise the quality of magistrate judges selected to achieve diversity.

133. Widespread change is a long way off. Recently, The National Law Journal reported that most of
the Justices of the United States Supreme Court make little effort to hire a diverse staff of law clerks.
Tony Mauro, Shut Out: SCOTUS Law Clerks Still Mostly White and Male, NAT’L L. J. (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites/nationallawjournal/2017/12/11/shut-out-scotus-law-clerksstill-mostly-white-and-male/?slreturn=20190018214329 [https://perma.cc/97F5-J436]. During the
Roberts’ Court, 85% of law clerks have been white. Only 20 of the 487 clerks were African American
and only nine were Latino. Id. The Justices hired male law clerks twice as often as female law clerks
despite that “more than half of all law students are female.” Id. The National Law Journal reported that
in 1998, “fewer than 1.8% of the clerks hired by the then-members of the court were African-American
(now it is 4%) and 1 percent were Hispanic (now the figure hovers at roughly 1.5%). The percentage of
clerks who are of Asian descent has doubled from 4.5% then to nearly 9% since 2005. Then, women
comprised one-fourth of the clerks; now they make up roughly a third.” Id. Justice Thomas placed the
blame on the “feeder judges” who recommended white, male law clerks most often. Id. Justice Thomas
said, “I don’t think it’s up to us to change other federal judges’ hiring practices” . . . “The reality is that
Hispanic and blacks do not show up in any great numbers.” Id. Contrary to this assertion, 30% of Justice
Sotomayor’s law clerks have been non-white and of the seven law clerks hired by Justice Gorsuch, three
are non-white. Id.
134. Elliot E. Slotnick, Gender, Affirmative Action, and Recruitment to the Federal Bench, 14
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 519, 526 (1984).
135. The Lady Vanishes, REVISIONIST HISTORY (2016) (accessed via internet browser).
136. Tom Pelissero, Rooney Rule leaves a legacy and impact far beyond NFL, USA TODAY, Apr. 14,
2017; Leigh Steinberg, Rooney Rule for NFL Minority Coaches Needs Tuning, FORBES, Jan. 19, 2017.
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C. Standardize and Require Targeted Recruitment Efforts
Old boy networks exclude those who are “out” and consider only those who
are “in.” When these networks are relied upon as a primary method for recruiting
judicial candidates, this results in a disproportionately low turnout of women and
minority applicants because they are, in general, “out.” Though it is laudable for
court members to encourage specific candidates to apply for open magistrate
judge positions, unless this is done with an awareness of the goals of diversity it
risks that the candidate pool will be increased with people of the same race, and,
to a lesser extent, the same gender as the judge doing the encouraging.137 An all
or nearly all white bench may be self-perpetuating regardless of the prospective
pipeline because it communicates a message that those of diverse backgrounds
need not apply. As astronaut Sally Ride said, “You can’t be what you can’t
see.”138
Consequently, targeted recruitment efforts must focus on quality candidates
who also represent a significant demographic in the community. Outreach efforts
need not focus only on candidates of a different race, ethnicity, and gender but
should consider also the diversity of viewpoints which may be obtained by adding
those of a different sexual orientation, geographical location, socio-economic
class, or physical ability, for example. Though establishing a bench that reflects
the community may be the goal, this should not mean search and recruitment
efforts are restricted to the confines of the district. Especially in those districts
where bar membership is unable to support a more diverse bench, courts should
expand their recruitment efforts to the region, and as needed, to the entire nation.
To do this, courts should contact specialty and minority bar groups,139 but they
should also actively seek out specific bar members who represent a historically
ignored group. The power behind a judge offering encouragement to a
prospective candidate cannot be ignored.
D. Improve the Salaries and Prestige of the Role of Magistrate Judges
Several chief judges in districts with small populations of diverse candidates
believed the relatively low judicial salary for federal judges was a significant
factor that thwarted efforts toward diversity. In several districts where there is a
small population of lawyers of color but a large population of people of color,
137. Brian W. Collins, Note, Tackling Unconscious Bias in Hiring Practices: The Plight of the Rooney
Rule, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 912 (2007) (“However, acknowledging that a problem exists is merely
symptom recognition; it does not guarantee a solution. Because unconscious bias is unintentional and not
easily recognizable, it will not disappear unless specifically addressed. Exhortation, education, and
protest all modify our conscious beliefs while leaving the unconscious foundation largely untouched.”).
138. Alison Beard, Sally Ride, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/09/sallyride?referral=00134 [https://perma.cc/2L9B-9K2Q] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
139. The effectiveness of communication with specialty and non-specialty bar associations needs
further study. Only about seventeen percent of responding magistrate judges indicated that they learned
of the vacant judicial position through this method. This may be because those selected are not members
of local bar associations for reasons including that they do not have the demographics served by the
association or because those who learned of the position through this method were not selected for the
position.
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most of these lawyers were successful in finding well-paying jobs out of the area.
Several chief judges lamented their inability to lure these diverse candidates into
applying for the position due to the substantial pay cut these lawyers would have
to take and the lower prestige this judicial office carries. Though the duty of
public service carried weight when deciding to apply for a magistrate judge
position, the chief judges believed it was not sufficient to overcome salary
concerns.140
Courts have no control over the salary paid to magistrate judges; this is the
job of Congress. Courts do have control over the prestige of the office. Many
districts limit the responsibility of their magistrate judges to routine, largely nonsubstantive work, and place them in an onerous supervisor-subordinate
relationship. It is not surprising then that there is a view in these districts that the
magistrate judge is “not a real judge.” Even in courts where magistrate judges
have great responsibility and are trusted and valued members of the judicial
team, practitioners still may have a faulty perception of the position. Expecting a
candidate to leave a high-paying, respected position for one where the judge is
treated like a research attorney is folly. Thus, hiring quality magistrate judges and
treating them with respect would likely go far in attracting quality diverse
candidates.
E. Track the Demographics of the Applicants
The model application form for magistrate judge openings fails to ask
questions about the applicant’s gender, ethnic and racial background, and sexual
orientation. The form should be modified to request this information even if it
permits the ability to “decline to state.”
One third of the chief judges reported their courts have modified the
application already. This enables them to track whether the judicial opening is
being communicated to diverse populations and to track the success of diverse
applicants through the selection process. As it stands, districts do not know
whether there are insufficient diverse candidates applying for the position or
whether these candidates are culled out by the merit selection panel.
Nevertheless, none of the chief judges interviewed knew whether this tracking
occurred and none expressed a belief that doing so could be helpful. Requiring
this type of tracking by the courts or the AO at least would provide a better
understanding of the scope of the problem.
Failing to track this information is a disadvantage for many reasons. First,
there may be an implicit or explicit bias at play. Even with hard data, trends are
difficult to spot and more so when the only information available is anecdotal.

140. Magistrate and Bankruptcy Judges are paid 92% of the salary of District Judges. Judicial
Salaries: U.S. Magistrate Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/
judicial-salaries-u.s.-magistrate-judges [https://perma.cc/SE8M-HYZ4] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). The
2017 annual salary for Magistrate Judges was $188,692. Other job perks could be emphasized during the
recruitment period such as the opportunities for travel and training and the favorable retirement scheme.
These “value-added” perks should be detailed in job announcements.
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For example, most of the chief judges reported pipeline issues cause the inability
of courts to diversify the magistrate judge bench. However, 49 districts have more
non-white and/or female district judges than their corresponding magistrate
judge bench, leading to the conclusion that diversity is possible.
Second, if a quality diverse candidate is not selected, maintaining this person’s
data would permit the court to make direct contact to encourage re-application
when there is another opening. This type of contact would help to spread the
word that the court really does consider and value non-white and non-male
candidates.
Third, failing to take note of the demographics of the applicant pool and
employing a true colorblind system of selection ignores the historical lack of
relative opportunities for women and people of color. No person of any race,
ethnicity, or gender is entitled to a federal judgeship. Likewise, no one should be
excluded from a federal judgeship due to any immutable characteristic.
F. Diversify Merit Selection Panels
Courts are instructed that “[t]o further efforts to achieve diversity in all
aspects of the magistrate judge selection process, courts are strongly encouraged
to appoint a diverse merit selection panel.”141 Further instruction could be helpful
explaining why this is important and describing ways to help the court identify
and select diverse panel.
Courts should be encouraged to consult specialty, minority, and voluntary bar
associations to identify prospective panelists and should account for efforts in
developing a diverse panel. These panelists would likely have contacts within
their own legal communities and may be better positioned to seek out potential
diverse applicants. Consequently, panelists should be given the opportunity to
encourage additional applications142 for the vacant position.
G. Standardize the Training of Merit Selection Panels
In general, we no longer live in a time or place where open bigotry is
tolerated. In the place of open bigots are those who maintain justifications for
acting in a manner that is discriminatory while maintaining a self-perception of
fairness.143 These people act in a discriminatory manner if social norms permit.144
Addressing these and the implicit biases held by the well-intentioned members
of hiring panels who denounce racism and sexism, is crucial.145

141. MAGISTRATE JUDGE SELECTION REPORT, supra note 86, at 18.
142. This seems to pose no greater risk of conflict than when judges encourage specific lawyers to
apply despite that ultimately, the judges select the new magistrate judges. If the senator’s committee can
do this when recruiting district judge applicants, it seems to make sense to allow panelists to do this too.
143. Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges, Employment Discrimination: The Role of Implicit
Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 553, 554 (2005).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 554–55.
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Courts can take steps to counter “hidden” explicit bias and implicit bias. One
important step is to standardize the training given to merit selection panelists and
to others involved in the selection process. Most of the panelists surveyed
received written instruction about their roles. Many courts provide panelists the
pamphlet issued by the Administrative Office of the Courts, “The Selection,
Appointment and Reappointment of United States Magistrate Judges.” Though
this document is comprehensive, it provides little guidance about selecting a
diverse bench and no information about how to do it. It states a broad and worthy
goal:
The essential function of courts is to dispense justice. An important component of this
function is the creation and maintenance of diversity in the court system. A community’s
belief that a court dispenses justice is heightened when the court reflects the
community’s racial, ethnic, and gender diversity.

Following this goal, the pamphlet instructs, “The merit selection panel is
obligated, under the Judicial Conference’s selection and appointment
regulations, to give due consideration to all qualified applicants for a magistrate
judge position, particularly those from underrepresented groups.” This guidance
fails to advise the group how to achieve this goal.
The pamphlet should be modified to explain to a greater degree why a diverse
bench is necessary and the importance of achieving this goal. It should explain
that diversity reinforces the court’s legitimacy in the community and provides
other benefits, including providing a broader perspective held by the bench,
which increases the likelihood that justice is meted out.
The pamphlet should provide actual training on the important topics that
impede the selection of a diverse bench, including detailed information about
implicit and explicit bias, why it exists, and specific, concrete steps to counteract
their effects. Courts should be provided materials, including videos, to be used
when presenting live training to the panel. Topics should include those discussed
in the pamphlet but should supplement that document. Providing these materials
would tend to increase the likelihood that courts would offer live training.
When discussing implicit bias, the materials could include standardized
interview questions to be posed to the candidates, to reduce the possibility of bias
seeping in. At a minimum, it should remind the panelists that questions should
be considered carefully to ensure the information sought is helpful to a fair and
impartial selection of the top candidates and that they don’t penalize any
applicant.
Not only would standardized training materials ease the way for the court,
but it would also provide a roadmap identifying the topics on which the panelists
should be most aware. “We all should know that diversity makes for a rich
tapestry, and we must understand that all the threads of the tapestry are equal in
value, no matter what their color.”146
146. Attributed to Maya Angelou. Maya Angelou’s Words that Spoke to All Our Lives, THE ROOT,
https://www.theroot.com/maya-angelou-s-words-that-spoke-to-all-our-lives-1790875890
[https://perma.cc/KAJ9-VNFD] (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
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H. Make Courts Account for Diversity Goals
Leading by example, the AO and individual courts must not only “talk the
talk,” but they must “walk the walk.” They cannot merely give the idea of
diversity lip service; they must showcase this commitment by taking the steps they
can to improve diversity wherever they can. Improving the hiring practices in the
AO’s office, the Clerk’s Office, Probation, and Pretrial Services of individual
districts, and establishing greater participation in the court’s committees by
women and people of color, are important steps to take. As the old cliché
reminds, actions really do speak louder than words. Anything short of a
demonstrated commitment, and the message will not be accepted by the selectors
and may be viewed as an invitation to thwart efforts toward diversity by keeping
out those who are not “suited” for the job.147
Unless courts are required to account for their efforts made toward diversity,
those courts that are mired in the status quo will have little impetus to change.
Currently, the goal of diversity is aspirational only though it appears diversity can
be achieved where it is fervently desired. Because necessity is the mother of
invention, holding courts accountable for documenting their efforts toward a
diverse magistrate judge bench would improve the likelihood of achieving such a
bench. Courts could be required, rather than just encouraged, to take particular
steps, for example, advertising in specialty and minority bar journals, making
presentations to lawyer groups whose membership advances diversity,
accounting for the number of diverse applicants, and documenting the results of
these applications, including why they were not selected if they were not. This
type of reporting would provide courts a reason to become creative in their
approach.
Almost uniformly, chief judges believe diversity provides legitimacy for the
judiciary locally and nationally. Because the very integrity of our system is at
issue, we must actively seek out this legitimacy or risk communities turning
against it.
VI
CONCLUSION
The lack of diversity of the magistrate judge bench stems not from a lack of
enthusiasm for the goal but from a lack of a consistent will to achieve it. Failing
to take time to understand where the problem lies and then failing to develop a
comprehensive approach to address the problem are the biggest impediments to
diversity. Despite the consistent view of the chief judges that the very legitimacy
and ongoing utility of the judiciary depends upon the perception of fairness that
can only be achieved by encouraging the belief that the courts belong to the

147. See Ziegert & Hanges, supra note 143, at 554 (“[O]rganizational climate is a function of what is
rewarded, supported, and expected in the organization and sends strong signals to employees and others
about what behavior is socially acceptable.”) (citing Benjamin Schneider Organizational Climate:
Individual Preferences and Organizational Realities, 56 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 211 (1972)).
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people they serve, too many courts accept, rather than challenge, the idea that
diversity cannot be achieved.
Conversely, many courts are so adept at advancing the cause of diversity they
no longer even think about it. These courts should be a model for the rest.
Individual districts should not be permitted to refuse these proven methods
because every court belongs not to the judges who work there, but to us all.

